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INTRODUCTION

F

rom its emergence in December 2019 through January
2021, there have been more than 100 million COVID-19
infections worldwide, with at least 26 million confirmed cases
in United States alone.1 As a result, companies and businesses
around the world are confronted with severe loss of revenue
and disrupted supply chains due to shutdown industries and
restrictions on movement and commerce. As a result, the rates
of unemployment and poverty have increased sharply, and millions of people across the United States and Europe have filed
for unemployment.2 Consequently, governments are collaborating, based on the latest scientific evidence, to prevent the
short-term recession from shifting to a global depression by
providing a package of legal, economic, and financial reforms.3
At the same time, corporations, in general, and boards of directors, in particular, are confronted with the challenge of designing specific strategies to address the COVID-19 crisis and its
1. Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Joe Hasell,
Coronavirus
Pandemic
(COVID-19),
OUR
WORLD
DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus (last visited February 1, 2021).
2. Rosamond Hutt, The economic effects of COVID-19 around the world,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(last
updated
May
14,
2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/coronavirus-economic-effectsglobal-economy-trade-travel; Survey, World Economic Outlook: The Great
Lockdown,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(Apr.
2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2020/04/14/global-financialstability-report-april-2020 (“It is very likely that this year the global economy
will experience its worst recession since the Great Depression, surpassing
that seen during the global financial crisis a decade ago.”).
3. See, e.g., Patricia Buckley, US policy response to COVID-19 aims to set
the
stage
for
recovery,
DELOITTE INSIGHTS
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/covid-19/evolution-andpolicy-response-to-the-covid-19-crisis.html; European Council Press Release,
Report on the Comprehensive Economic Policy Response to the COVID-19
Pandemic (Apr. 9, 2020) (“The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an unprecedented challenge with very severe socio-economic consequences. We are
committed to do everything necessary to meet this challenge in a spirit of
solidarity”).
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aftermath. These plans have to consider different aspects of the
organization’s business that will ensure the survival of the firm
in times of financial distress, such as the possibility of renegotiation with lenders for short or near-term debt service extensions and restructuring different loan guarantees. Moreover,
directors are obliged to respond to the potential changes in consumers’ preferences and design specific business policies that
will tackle such demands under the short availability of suppliers and other service providers. This is especially true for small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that suffered enormous
economic loss. Those losses in many cases threaten the continued existence of these companies as ongoing concerns, considering that they have limited access to alternative financial resources, such as raising equity in the capital markets or substituting company debt in exchange for shares.4
Accordingly, this article explores directors’ duty of care in
times of financial distress from a global perspective. It argues
that, whereas the financial crunch from 2007 through 2009 was
a result of governance failures that yielded vast reforms reinforcing the monitoring role of directors, the current economic
crisis will emphasize the importance of their advisory role.
Therefore, this article expects legislators and courts to design
specific regulatory arrangements that reinforce this function.
Further, it argues that the civil law, rather than AngloAmerican law, on directors’ duty of care provides boards with a
wider scope of discretion to confront the challenges associated
with COVID-19. The reason is that the civil law involves governance arrangements that are designed following a firmspecific view, which considers the unique features of the company and markets. This article applies this general argument
to different types of SMEs, mainly family business firms and
venture capital-backed firms.
Part I analyzes the dual role of the board of directors. It argues that the global pandemic will reemphasize the significance of the advisory role of directors. Part II is devoted to exploring the current global landscape of the law regarding directors’ duty of care and discusses the complex governance ar4. For an extensive overview of the world governments’ response to foster
SME resilience following the COVID-19 pandemic, see Coronavirus (COVID19): SME Policy Responses, OECD (last updated July 15, 2020),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=119_119680-di6h3qgi4x&title=Covid19_SME_Policy_Responses.
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rangements of the civil law in comparison to the uniform
standards of responsibility of the Anglo-American tradition.
Part III will explain why the civil law’s nuanced regimes of
care provide directors with superior mechanisms to meet the
financial challenges of our times in two concrete types of SMEs:
family business and venture capital-backed firms.
I. THE DUAL ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The board of directors is a fundamental institution in the
corporate governance structure5 and is perceived to hold two
central roles: advising the management on critical decisions
and monitoring management’s conduct.6 This Part is devoted to
exploring these general roles and to arguing that, while the financial turnover from 2007 through 2009 has emphasized the
oversight function of directors,7 the current pandemic-induced
financial crisis will highlight the advisory function of directors.8
5. For a large survey on the functions of board of directors in corporate
governance, see, e.g., Renée B. Adams, Boards, and the Directors Who Sit on
Them, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
291, 305 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017).
6. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 275, 277–86 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (“The role and functions of the board
have been defined mainly by nonlegal norms and expectations. Although the
board’s functions have therefore varied over time, today they can be sorted
into three basic categories. These are management, oversight, and service.”);
J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Demythification of the Board of Directors, 52 AM.
BUS. L.J. 131, 134 (2015) (“Boards are commonly said to both monitor and
advise management.”); Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 798 (2011) (“The board performs an advisory function, offering advice and opinions to management about general business concerns”).
7. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 281–82; Stephen M. Bainbridge & M.
Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66
STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2014) (“The role of the typical public corporation
board shifted from a mainly advisory function in the 1970s to an emphasis by
the late 1990s on active and independent monitoring of the top management
team.”).
8. See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 929 (2010) (“Corporations largely have sacrificed the potential value of managing boards in favor of the independent monitoring
board.”); Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause
the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B. C. L. REV. 877, 884 (2018) (“Perhaps to reconcile these tensions, boards of large, public corporations have, over time, large-

2020] Directors' Duty of Care During a Global Pandemic

103

A. The Advisory Role of Directors
Generally, corporate law provides the board of directors with
the primary responsibilities concerning the strategy and functioning of the company.9 The board “advis[es] the CEO and top
managers on administrative and other managerial issues, as
well as more actively initiating and formulating strategy.”10
The board has a number of primary functions, including presenting strategic direction, overseeing the executive’s daily
conduct, and approving business objectives and effective corporate designs.11 The board of directors is also authorized to make
decisions such as forming strategic goals and missions with
management, taking actions concerning specific matters, such
as the election of officers, approving important transactions involving the company’s assets, and appointing senior executives
and officers.12 Although the literature has not yet reached a
consensus on identifying the board’s advisory role and its content, many commentators argue that the advisory roles should
be defined in three critical board aspects: service, strategy, and
control.13 The board’s service role refers to the role of directors
to provide advice and counsel to the CEO and other senior executives.14 The board’s strategy and control roles include the
formulation of corporate strategy and supervising its imple-

ly abandoned their advising role and instead focused on monitoring. In response to shareholder pressure and regulatory requirements, companies have
dramatically increased the proportion of independent directors comprising
their boards in the last several decades. This shift away from managerdirectors reflects shareholders’ and policymakers’ preferences for directors
who primarily monitor, rather than advise, management.”).
9. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 276 (“Although the differences detail
across national boundaries, corporation codes (a.k.a. company laws) establish
the board of directors as the key player in the formal decision-making structure.”).
10. Jonathan L. Johnson, Catherine M. Daily & Alan E. Ellstrand, Boards
of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22(3) J. MGMT. 409, 411 (1996).
11. Adams, supra note 5, at 305–06.
12. Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/08/principles-of-corporate-governance/.
13. Shaker A. Zahra & John A. Pearce, Boards of Directors and Corporate
Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model, 15 J. MGMT 291, 303
(1989); Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand supra note 10, at 411–29.
14. Id. at 424.
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mentation by the management through the provision of expertise.15
Several empirical studies point to board characteristics, and
more specifically, board composition, capital, identification,
commitment, and motivation, as important determinants for
board service task performance.16 For example, board members
who possess diverse expertise in areas such as accounting, finance, management, and law play an essential role in the
board’s advisory function, mainly in cases of complex business
decisions.17 Additionally, financial institutions’ outside directors are thought to increase the firm’s access to different
sources of capital.18 Also, directors who maintain strong political connections with legislators and regulators can support the
company’s dealings on critical matters with different public authorities.19 Moreover, it was observed that a board member’s
background and diverse knowledge have a positive relationship
with service task performance.20 Research indicates that service task performance increases as board members identify
themselves to a larger extent with the firm’s operations.21 Fur15. Hanna Maria Sievinen, Tuuli Ikäheimonen & Timo Pihkala, The Advisory Role of Non‐Family Board Members: A Case‐Based Study of a Family
Firm,
J.
MGMT
GOVERNANCE
1,
4–6
(2019),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10997-019-09496-8.pdf.
16. For an extensive discussion on the empirical evidence on this issue,
see, Carl Åberg, Max Bankewitz & Mirjam Knockaert, Service Tasks of Board
of Directors: A Literature Review and Research Agenda in an Era of New Governance Practices, 37 EUR. MGMT J. 648, 651 (2019).
17. In this respect, the European Commission states that “Diversified expertise is considered the key to efficient board work. A variety of professional
backgrounds is needed to ensure that the board as a whole understands, for
example, the complexities of global markets, the company’s financial objectives and the impact of the business on different stakeholders including employees.” The EU Corporate Governance Framework, §1.1.1., COM (2011) 164
final; Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 279.
18. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 49 (2012).
19. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 278–79.
20. Patricia Gabaldon, Sadi Bogaç Kanadli & Max Bankewitz, How Does
Job-Related Diversity Affect Boards’ Strategic Participation? An InformationProcessing Approach, 51(6) LONG RANGE PLANNING 937, 947 (2018) (finding
that job-related diversity contributes to boards’ strategic participation
through directors’ use of knowledge and skills).
21. See generally Sylvie Guerrero & Michel Seguin, Motivational Drivers of
Non-executive Directors, Cooperation, and Engagement in Board Roles, 24 J.
MANAGERIAL ISSUES 61 (2012) (finding that nonexecutives’ pro-organizational
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ther, trust between board members and the CEO has been
found to positively impact service task performance relating to
the creation of cooperative behavior and positive board dynamics.22 Therefore, a recent study reveals that service task performance has a significant positive impact on firm financial
outcomes.23
Recently, J. Robert Brown argued that boards do not perform
a significant advisory role.24 Since directors have inherent authority to intervene in corporate affairs, including the right to
dismiss top executives, the potential for directors’ intervention
has grown. Therefore, management is incentivized to reduce
this risk by ensuring that the board consists of directors who
favor the positions taken by the CEO. To maintain this result,
executives may push for the appointment of members to the
board of directors who are inclined toward adopting the policies
of the management.25 This may also be accomplished by withholding information from the board and reducing its ability to
monitor management’s performance, thereby eliminating the
advisory role of the board and diminishing the cooperative connection between the management and directors.26 Such an outcome will narrow the board’s function to oversight of manage-

motivation is positively related to cooperation and engagement in board roles.
This relationship is stronger when needed for achievement and need for identification are higher); Dmitri Melkumov, Eric Breit & Violetta Khoreva, Directors’ Social Identifications and Board Tasks: Evidence from Finland, 23
CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 42 (2015) (finding that organizational identification is positively related to the level of board task involvement).
22. Pingying Zhang, Power and Trust in Board–CEO Relationships, 17 J.
MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 745, 754, 759–761 (2011) (“[P]roviding evidence that
board trust in the CEO reduces relational risks between the board and the
CEO, which improves board control task performance.”)
23. Sung Wook Joh & Jin Young Jung, When Do Firms Benefit from Affiliated Outside Directors? Evidence from Korea, 26 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L
REV. 397, 404–08 (2018) (presenting evidence that firms with more affiliated
outside directors—especially those with social ties—have greater firm value).
24. Brown, supra note 6, at 154.
25. Brown, supra note 6, at 152–53.
26. Id. at 162. See also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010) (noting that “By the same token, we believe that
CEOs involve board members more in major strategic decisions and that
board members have become more willing to share any concerns over operations with their CEOs outside the boardroom.”).
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ment’s conduct, resulting in the relationship between the board
and management to be more adversarial than cooperative.27
Brown’s observation concerning the risk of removal of the
board’s advisory role is supported by a recent empirical study
on the trust relationship between directors and management.28
The study surveys, across a number of different cultures, how
the perception of fairness between directors and the CEO influence the directors’ inclination to provide resources and monitor
the CEO’s behavior.29 The researchers show that board members may provide significant assistance to the CEO when those
directors believe that the CEO treats them with respect and
dignity.30 Moreover, they demonstrate that emotional and psychological support between directors and the CEO is strongly
and positively associated with the inclination of directors to
provide resources to the CEO in countries with robust individualist cultures.31 In individualistic countries, this effect might
be attributed to the culture’s emphasis on relational interactions and their impact on “self-concept and self-esteem.”32
Thus, this study indicates that directors will be more inclined
to provide advisory resources to CEOs who treat them with respect by sharing essential information on the operations of the
company and by forming close collaborations regarding the
company’s strategy.
B. The Oversight Role of Directors
Alongside its advisory role, the board maintains a monitoring
role. The board of directors is responsible for mitigating the
agency costs that arise with the divergence of interests between the shareholders and management in diffuse ownership
structure, and between controlling and minority shareholders
27. Brown, supra note 6, at 158–62.
28. See generally Esther B. Del Brio, Rosa M. Hernandez-Maestro & Toru
Yoshikaya, How Does Interpersonal Justice Affect Outside Directors’ Governance Behavior? A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 12 REV. MANAGERIAL SCI. 683
(2018).
29. See generally id.
30. Id. at 687, 702.
31. Id. at 703 (“Our findings indicate that CEO interpersonal justice is
more positively associated with resource provision for directors in Canada
than in Singapore and Spain, supporting the argument that individuals in a
highly individualistic culture emphasize fair treatment by other individuals.”)
32. Id. at 692.
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in concentrated ownership structure.33 At the same time, directors in general and independent directors in particular are
highly dependent on the extent of information management
chooses to provide them in board meetings.34 Moreover, there
are often professional or social ties between the management
and independent directors that might impair the director’s
judgment in assessing the management conduct. Those social
ties can result in an unwillingness of independent directors to
confront management, especially because they are dependent
on them for reappointment.35 Due to structural bias, the longer
the tenure of an individual director, the smaller the likelihood
that he will voice his opinion in a manner that might endanger
the persistence of those social ties.36 In addition, the effectiveness with which independent directors can perform their monitoring duties is likely to be restrained by their duties arising
from pursuits outside the focal firm.37 Most independent directors have full-time jobs, and many also have multiple board offices. The time and cognitive attention that they provide to
those outside demands inherently reduce their overall ability to

33. See Yaron Nili & Kobi Kastiel, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super
Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 22 n.18 (2017)
(“[T]he board is charged with a monitoring role, making sure that shareholder interests are fully served, in an effort to constrain the agency costs associated with a managerial centric corporation model.”).
34. Id. at 23. Similarly, Kelli Alces argued that “the board of directors has
outlived its purpose . . . Responsibility for the success or failure of the firm
lies with a group of professionals, the board of directors, who work part time
to monitor the firm’s business, and management, who receive almost all of
their information about the firm secondhand.” Alces, supra note 6, at 783–85.
She observes that corporate officers and investors (including creditors) are
the “real” corporate decision makers. Id.
35. Yaron Nili, The ‘New Insiders’: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 97, 118–20 (2016).
36. Id. at 118–21. Fairfax suggests several other reasons why independent
directors of large public corporations may not be up to the task of monitoring,
such as: the size and complexity of modern corporations’ business; the scope
of the oversight duty may be unmanageable; directors may lack the capacity
needed for the task; do not possess time and information required for the job.
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for Insider Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127,
164–67 (2010); Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’
Duty to Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
416, 441–48 (2012).
37. Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1181–82
(2020).
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be effective at the focal firm.38 Those constraints limit the ability of the board to independently obtain complete information
regarding the company’s operations, a prerequisite to the
board’s ability to perform its monitoring role adequately.39
Considering these limitations, several commentators have offered various solutions. For instance, Usha Rodrigues argued
that the board’s central role should be confined to monitoring
CEO performance and pay, overseeing the audit function, and
handling takeovers and derivative suits.40 Regarding conflicts
of interest, the board’s lack of ties to management becomes a
strength, and so it is on these subjects that the board functions
should be focused.41 Stephen Bainbridge and Todd Henderson
argued that directors are “part-timers, the vast majority of
whom have fulltime employment elsewhere,”42 and suffer from
a severe information asymmetry vis-à-vis the fulltime managers they purportedly supervise.43 As a result, although both investors and society at large rely on corporate directors to play a
central role in corporate governance by overseeing management teams, there is little confidence that modern boards are
optimally structured to perform such tasks efficiently.44 Therefore, they proposed outsourcing the board of directors’ functions
to a separate entity, which they termed “board service providers” (BSPs).45 Accordingly, corporations would be required to
hire another entity to act as the corporation’s board of directors
and provide it with director services. Akin to other service

38. Steven Boivie, Michael K. Bednar, Ruth V. Aguilera & Joel L. Andrus,
Are Boards Designed to Fail? The Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring, 10 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 1, 16 (2016).
39. For recent empirical study demonstrating that independent directors
have been co-opted by management in a manner that undermines their ability to protect shareholder interests against self-interests of members of top
management, see S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The
Elusive Monitoring Function of Independent Directors, 21 U. OF PA. J. OF BUS.
L. 235 (2019).
40. Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1070–81 (2013).
41. Id.
42. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 7, at 1063–64.
43. Id. at 1065–66.
44. Stephen Bainbridge, Rethinking the Board of Directors: Getting Outside the Box, 74 BUS. LAW. 285 (2019).
45. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 7, at 1068.
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firms, BSPs would unify the various aspects of director services
under one single roof.46
Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili argued that to achieve a meaningful monitoring outcome, the law should create a new institution within the board: the “Board Suite.”47 Such a suite is a
dedicated office within the board and consists of a special counsel that would serve as an information facilitator, and will be
appropriately staffed and designed in regards to the size of the
company.48 The main functions of such an office will be to independently collect and share valuable business information with
the members of the board by eliminating the needs of directors
to approach the management for obtaining essential data.49
Moreover, Jennifer O’Hare argued that, in the absence of clear
fiduciary duties of officers to provide information to the board,
the bylaws of all public companies should include a specific
provision entitled the “Duty to Inform Bylaw.”50 A duty to inform bylaw would impose upon the CEO and the Chief Financial Officer a duty to immediately inform the board of all information necessary to enable the board to manage the company’s affairs in accordance with its statutory and fiduciary obligations.51
C. The Move Towards the Monitoring Model and the Future
Reemergence of the Advisory Role of the Board of Directors
The relative balance between the advisory model and monitoring functions has shifted over time. Survey data suggests
that in the 1970s, boards had a mainly advisory role, and from
the 1990s, an emphasis was given to the managerial functions
reflected in policymaking and setting strategy.52 Since the early
2000s, the role of the board has primarily been limited to over46. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, OUTSOURCING THE
BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN IMPROVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 87–103 (2018).
47. Nili & Kastiel, supra note 33, at 52–56.
48. Id. at 52–53.
49. Id. at 54–55.
50. Jennifer O’Hare, Private Ordering and Improving Information Flow to
the Board of Directors: The Duty to Inform Bylaw, 53 U. OF RICHMOND L. REV.
557, 608–10 (2019).
51. Id. at 596–608.
52. See generally Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58 (2010).
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sight of the company’s senior management conduct.53 This development has mainly occurred due to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and the Dodd-Frank Act in the United
States.54 Both acts enhanced the oversight role of the boards of
directors at the expense of the advisory function following the
financial crisis of the years 2007–2008.55 Those regulations included major governance reforms that anchor the oversight of
directors over the remunerations of executives and the risks
involved in their conduct.56 However, this Article argues that
the emphasis given to the oversight function, rather than the
advisory function, has hampered companies’ ability to properly
confront financial crises that are a product of objective economic emergencies, rather than those arising from global systematic governance failures.57 Several surveys indicate that independent directors in the United States devote much more time
to monitoring the conduct of management than providing advice on corporate strategy and policies. For instance, a survey
conducted in 2016 by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the large
professional services firm, showed that directors want to spend
more time on strategy than on structuring executive remuneration.58 Specifically, 61% of the respondents claimed that they
53. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 281–82.
54. Id. at 282. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C (2012)); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
55. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 282.
56. Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 346 (2012)
(“The monitoring model forms the basis of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms that
sought to strengthen the hand of independent directors vis-à-vis corporate
management”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal
Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 239 (1997) (“the monitoring model of the
board has been almost universally accepted”).
57. Olubunmi Faleye, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash, The Trouble With Too
Much Board Oversight, 54 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 53, 54–55 (2013) (“Conversely, corporate innovation suffered when the board monitored intensely.
Companies with such boards invested less in R&D, received fewer patents
overall and received fewer influential patents as measured by the frequency
of citations of the patents they received. Moreover, we found that companies
in which directors were more focused on oversight had poorer short- and longrun acquisition performance.”)
58. The Swinging Pendulum: Board Governance in the Age of Shareholder
Empowerment,
PWC:
GOV.
INSIGHTS
CENTER
(Oct.
2016),
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would like additional boardroom time devoted to structuring
and discussing strategy policies.59 In addition, directors are the
least interested in devoting more time to executive compensation.60 This may be due to companies and practitioners expending extensive energy over the last several years to designing
effective say-on-pay policies.61 Thus, there is a concern that in a
rush for preferring monitoring over and above other board responsibilities, such as succession planning and counsel, boards
are increasingly unready to address crisis management or issues affecting the long-term health of firms.62
This observation is also supported in several empirical studies. For example, Renée B. Adams showed that directors vary
in how important they perceive their monitoring and advisory
roles in a survey of the population of directors of listed companies in Sweden.63 In particular, she demonstrated that where
directors have devoted significant time to oversight duties, they
received less strategic information from management.64 Further, directors who consider their role to consist primarily in
monitoring do not feel that they need to significantly engage in
board discussions or that the CEO values their contribution.65
These findings raise doubts about whether increasing the monhttp://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/speech/assets_pwc-2016annual-corporate—directors—survey.pdf.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Marta Geletkanycz & Brian K. Boyd, Research Governance and Practice in the 21st Century: Taking Stock of Board Reforms, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 292 (Jonas Gabrielsson, Wafa Khlif &
Sibel Yamak eds., 2019); Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Where Boards
Fall Short, HARV. BUS. REV. (2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/where-boards-fallshort (“Most governance experts would agree that public company directors
need to put in more days on the job and devote more time to understanding
and shaping strategy”).
63. See generally Renée B. Adams, Asking Directors About Their Dual
Roles (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No.
243/2009, 2009).
64. See generally id. at 16–18
65. Id. at 18 (“The results in Columns VIII-XI indicate that directors who
perceive their advisory role to be greater are more likely to have an opinion
and to voice their views in decision-making and to feel that their inputs are
valued. In contrast, directors who perceive their monitoring role to be stronger are less likely to participate and feel that their inputs are valued less by
the CEO… They also highlight that directors who perceive their monitoring
role to be stronger perceive that they contribute less to decision-making”).

112

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 46:1

itoring strength of the board will necessarily lead directors to
be more productive, as governance standards often implicitly
assume.66 Moreover, another study showed that intense monitoring reduces the effectiveness of directors in strategic advising.67 When directors’ expertise and information exchange between the CEO and directors are crucial to ensuring optimal
results, intense monitoring reduces board effectiveness by disrupting the relationship between those two parties.68 As a result, intense board oversight is associated with lower acquisition announcement returns, lower post-merger operating performance, longer time to acquisition completion, and reduced
corporate innovation.69 This same study showed that overcommitting independent directors to monitoring duties, when the
need for advising is substantial, significantly reduces directors’
effectiveness and firm value.70 Furthermore, other research
showed the contribution of directors to firm resilience by assessing the relative importance of their advisory and monitoring roles at times of distress.71 Based on manually collected US
data,72 the authors examined the value of the advisory function
relative to the monitoring one in times of firm-specific crisis,
focusing on the board characteristics, such as independence,
size, the presence of directors with industry expertise and directors’ busyness.73 The empirical results indicated that advising-inclined boards are more valuable than monitoring-inclined
ones. In particular, they found that more members of the board
who are independent and possess industry expertise are associated with a more negative market reaction in case of crisis.74
In contrast, directors’ busyness, as well as larger boards, positively affected the reaction to disruptive events. They found
that being a busy director is a signal that the person is more
talented and has incentives to devote his attention to the dis66. Id. at 28.
67. Olubunmi Faleye, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash, The Costs of Intense
Board Monitoring, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 160, 173 (2011).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 176–78.
71. Ettore Croci, Gerard Hertig, Layla Khoja & Luh Luh Lan, The Advisory and Monitoring Roles of the Board - Evidence from Disruptive Events 23
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Finance Working Paper No. 673/2020, 2020).
72. Id. at 10–13.
73. Id. at 2–10.
74. Id. at 19–20.
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rupted firm.75 Moreover, because disruptive events are generally associated with complexity of business decision-making,
larger boards may be considered to be more effective for minimizing the negative consequences of disruptive events.76 These
findings exemplify that “firms [are] benefitting more from
boards that are less hands-on monitors and more hands-off advisors when there is a negative shock.”77
Given the renewed importance of the advisory role of the
board of directors in the current, pandemic-induced financial
crisis, it can be expected that in the near future, legislators and
courts will design various regulatory reforms that reinforce the
advisory functions of directors in a way that will assist directors in tackling the challenges associated with the pandemic’s
economic and social consequences. Alternatively, financial regulators may act to lessen the regulatory burden imposed on directors to enable them to invest more substantial managerial
resources required to ensure the survival of companies.78 Accordingly, the next sections focus on the global regimes of directors’ fiduciary duties, and, in particular, on the duty of care.
They also explore whether those duties are properly suited to
regulate directors’ conduct in this new era. This article demonstrates that the civil law’s directors’ fiduciary duties are sensitive to the unique features of the company and the markets
and, therefore, are more appropriate than the Anglo-American
law to confront current challenges. Finally, this article applies
this argument to different two types of SMEs: the family business firm and the startup firm.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 4.
78. See, e.g., Order Under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Modifying Exemptions from the Reporting and Proxy Delivery Requirements for Public Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 88,465, 85
Fed. Reg 17,610 (Mar. 25, 2020); Press Release, Sec. and Exchange Commission, SEC Extends Conditional Exemptions from Reporting and Proxy
Delivery Requirements for Public Companies, Funds, and Investment Advisers Affected by Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-73; Statement of Policy: listed
companies and recapitalisation issuances during the coronavirus crisis, FIN.
CONDUCT
AUTH.
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/listed-companies-recapitalisationissuances-coronavirus (the UK FCA announced a series of measures aimed at
assisting companies to raise new share capital in response to the coronavirus
crisis while retaining an appropriate degree of investor protection).
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II. THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF CARE
This Part is devoted to exploring the patterns of directors’ duty of care in different legal systems. It demonstrates that, while
Anglo-American law provides a uniform standard of care that
is applicable across various industries, civil law’s nuanced
standards of conduct for directors that depend on the director’s
position and personal characteristics, type and condition of the
firm, and other relevant aspects of the markets, are better
equipped to respond to crises of the type caused by the COVID19 pandemic. This discrepancy has significant implications for
providing directors with the necessary mechanisms and scope
of discretion to confront the negative results of the financial
crisis.
A. The Anglo-American Law
This section discusses the Anglo-American approach on directors’ duty of care by focusing on the fundamentals of their
standard of care concerning corporate decision-making.
1. American Law
Under Delaware corporate law,79 the duty of care is encompassed in the fiduciary duties imposed on directors and mangers.80 The duty of care focuses on informed decision-making.
Accordingly: “Directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior
to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they

79. Delaware has long been the dominant state in the United States for
attracting business incorporations, especially incorporations of the most powerful and profitable firms. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim & Brian J. Broughman, Delaware’s Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 275 (2015) (demonstrating that Delaware’s continued success is explained by the familiarity of
business parties with Delaware law after decades of dominance).
80. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become so informed,
they must then act with the requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”);
see generally Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40
J. CORP. L. 647, 648 (2015) (“the duty of care is not simply an ill-fitting appendage to the duty of loyalty, but rather an essential aspect of the singular
fiduciary concept that also encompasses the duty of loyalty.”)
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must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”81
Moreover, directors have a duty “to exercise oversight” and to
monitor the corporation’s operational viability, legal compliance, and financial performance.82 For a plaintiff to prevail in
an action alleging a violation of the duty of care, they must
show that a fiduciary acted in bad faith—that is, either “(a) the
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or information system or controls; or (b) having
implemented such a system or controls, [the directors] consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”83 A director may be held liable if he
acts in bad faith; that is, he made no good faith efforts to ensure that the company had in place effective system of controls.84 Since corporate law’s liability regime is based on the
assumption that directors and not shareholders are responsible
for managing the company’s business affairs, Delaware courts
adopted the presumption that “in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.”85 This presumption, known
as the “business judgment rule,” is justified on the merits of
several rationales.86
First, because shareholders are better positioned to diversify
the risks involved in their corporate investments, they do not
want directors to carry business decisions with risk-aversion.87
81. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
82. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970–71
(Del. Ch. 1996). See also In Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
83. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006).
84. Id.
85. Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1035, 1045 (2018). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984).
86. For helpful discussion of the business judgment rule’s evolution, see D.
Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 83, 83–84 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon, eds., 2016).
87. As Chancellor Allen explained in Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.,
shareholders want directors to take risk: “Shareholders can diversify the
risks of their corporate investments. Thus, it is in their economic interest for
the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value invest-
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Therefore, the law negates directors from assuming liability for
taking good faith risks by avoiding the use of simple negligence
standard.88 Moreover, even where it is possible to hold directors
responsible for a breach of the duty of care, Delaware law requires that directors acted with gross negligence.89 In Smith v.
Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that an
uninformed board decision could overcome a court’s deference
to board authority and create director liability.90 Accordingly,
to establish that a board has made an informed decision, a
court must determine “whether the directors have informed
themselves ‘prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.’”91 Gross negligence
is the standard used to determine if there has been a breach of
the directors’ duty of care regarding keeping informed of the

ment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return first. Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally
want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests, across
the full range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if
corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept
for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above
the firm’s cost of capital.” Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052
(Del. Ch. 1996).
88. As the Delaware Chancery Court explained in In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litig., (“[p]recisely so as to ensure that directors are not unduly hampered in taking good faith risks, our law eschews the use of a simple negligence standard. Even where it is possible to hold directors responsible for a
breach of the duty of care, Delaware law requires that directors have acted
with gross negligence. Unless judges are mindful of the substantial difference
between a simple negligence and gross negligence standard, the policy purpose served by Delaware’s choice of a gross negligence standard risks being
undermined.”) In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 651–52
(Del. Ch. 2008).
89. Generally, the law distinguishes between general negligence and gross
negligence. Typically, if a person has not only failed to apply the duty of care
as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised, but has also missed
achieving the minimum level of care a regular person should have exercised,
this person is considered to be grossly negligent. See Mo Zhang, Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon, 10 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS.
415,
435–36
(2011).
See
also
FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 98–100 (1991).
90. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985). See also
Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 27, 48 (2017).
91. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d, at 872.
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company’s practices.92 Thus, the broad discretion held by directors and managers provides them with the necessary means to
advance shareholder interests, since it allows them to take significant risks without the constant fear that they will be held
liable if those risks materialize.93
Second, the business judgment rule is justified in light of the
private ordering of corporate governance arrangements, which
grant extensive authority to the board to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.94 In this context, the Delaware Supreme
Court has described the rule as “an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors.”95
Third, there is a concern about the institutional capability of
the courts to properly evaluate the merits of business decisions.96 Judges respect board decision-making because they
lack the training and practice of board members in determining
what the best corporate decision is, and therefore, defer to the
substantive decisions of the board.97 Thus, inflicting liability on
directors may often be a result of “hindsight bias” rather than
an objective assessment of their conduct.98 To avoid the risk of
liability, directors and officers “will engage in unnecessary investigations and obtain unnecessary second and third opinions,
thereby causing the corporation to incur excessive precaution

92. Id. at 872–73. See also Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does
Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years after Van Gorkom,
62 BUS. LAW. 135, 154–160 (2006) (recommending that the Delaware courts
should adopt a lenient gross negligence standard that can be consistently
applied when examining the question of whether a board of directors was
adequately informed in making certain business decisions).
93. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
94. Sharfman, supra note 92, at 43–47.
95. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (quoting Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981)).
96. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“Courts are illfitted to attempt to weight the ‘adequacy’ of consideration...”).
97. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del Ch. 1997)); Sharfman, supra note 92, at 46.
98. Sharfman, supra note 92, at 144 (“Handicapped by “hindsight bias,”
courts would constantly be tempted to see more negligence than really existed, finding liability in honest decisions that had bad outcomes or appeared
inept”).

118

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 46:1

costs.”99 These policy considerations indicate that the overall
costs of using fiduciary duty litigation to constrain management conduct may outweigh any benefits that shareholders
may maintain in the form of compensating them for the harm
incurred.100
Generally, Delaware corporate law employs three different
standards of judicial review for business decisions by a board of
directors.101 On one end of the spectrum, there is the business
judgment rule,102 which applies when the plaintiff cannot establish that directors engaged in fraud, bad faith, or selfdealing.103 To rebut the presumption granted by the rule, a
plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence that directors
were at least grossly negligent in not staying appropriately informed of the company’s practices or were motivated by interests other than those of the company’s stockholders as a
whole.104 On the other side of the spectrum there is the entire
99. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW.
865, 873 (2005).
100. Id. at 879. See also Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61, 70 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (“In duty of care cases, the
benefits of judicial review are especially questionable. Not only are unconflicted directors likely to be better decision makers than shareholders or
courts, but in addition the risk of ruinous liability would be so great in public
corporations that it would lead to excessive risk aversion on the part of directors.”).
101. For a detailed discussion on the different standards of judicial review
employed by Delaware courts concerning directors’ business conduct, see, e.g.,
Morgan White-Smith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers
Depend on the Method of Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1177 (2012).
102. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746–47 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“[t]he business judgment rule is not actually a substantive rule of law,
but instead it is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”).
103. Id. at 747; In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch.
2013) (“the court merely looks to see whether the business decision made was
rational in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s objectives.”).
104. William M. Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., A Brief
Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116
PENN STATE L. REV. 838, 843 (2012) (“In this context, Delaware courts have
defined gross negligence as “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard
of the whole body of stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of
reason.”).

2020] Directors' Duty of Care During a Global Pandemic

119

fairness rule, which applies in cases where directors are faced
with actual conflicts of interest.105 This rule obligates company
directors to establish to the court’s satisfaction that the related
party transaction was a result of both fair dealing and fair
price.106 Delaware’s intermediate standard of review is enhanced scrutiny, which applies to specific and identifiable settings involving potential conflicts of interest where the realities
of the decision-making context can undermine the decisions of
even independent and disinterested directors.107 Enhanced
scrutiny deals with supposedly ״slight ״breaches of fiduciary
loyalty, where the conflict of interest is potential rather than
concrete.108 Accordingly, courts are required to examine: (1)
whether the decision-making process included the adequate
information on which directors based their decisions, and (2)
whether their actions should be considered reasonable given
the circumstances existed when decisions were made.109

105. For example, when a decision was made by a group of directors, that
did not comprise a disinterested and independent board majority. In
re Trados, 73 A.3d at 44 (“Entire fairness, Delaware’s most onerous standard,
applies when the board labors under actual conflicts of interest.”).
106. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former
embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of
the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger,
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company’s stock . . . However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as
between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a
whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”); see also Amir N. Licht,
Farewell to Fairness: Towards Retiring Delaware’s Entire Fairness Review, 4
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 39–55 (2020) (calling the courts to abolish entire fairness
review).
107. Gavin v. Tousignant (In re Ultimate Escapes Holdings, LLC), 551 B.R.
749, 761 (D. Del. 2016).
108. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180–181 (Del. 1986); Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 682 (Del. Ch.
2014) (“Revlon is a standard of review in which ‘the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the board’s actions under a standard
that is more stringent than business judgment review and yet less severe
than the entire fairness standard.”).
109. In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015).
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2. United Kingdom Law
The reasons for limiting the duty of care have been less critical in the United Kingdom (UK), where more attention is provided to the issue of accountability.110 The original standard for
directors’ duty of care in the UK was one of gross negligence.111
The common law of directorial duty of care was influenced by
the bailment and trusteeship care standards as adapted to the
corporate form.112 The directorial duty was formed in the late
nineteenth century and dominated UK company law into the
twentieth century.113 Though influenced by bailment standards,
directors were not understood to be perfectly analogous to bailees.114 Accordingly, “it would not be inaccurate to describe the
UK’s common law standard as a gross negligence standard”
that follows the nineteenth century case law on bailment care
standards.115
The earliest case to consider the existence and nature of a duty of care concerning directors in the UK was 1742’s The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton.116 The general charge that the
Chancery Court considered was whether the committee men—
i.e., directors—of a credit corporation had behaved with “such a
supine and gross negligence of their duty . . . that it will
amount to a breach of trust” in failing to appoint an officer
whose function was to provide oversight of the activities of other officers.117 The standard applied by Lord Hardwicke to a
bailee who undertook to perform a role, even if unrewarded,
was equivalent to the standard that he had articulated for
trustees.118 The Sutton ruling articulated the standard of care
and diligence required by directors upon the lowest standard

110. Jennifer G. Hill & Matthew Conaglen, Directors’ Duties and Legal Safe
Harbours: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY
LAW 305, 322 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018).
111. Id.
112. DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY LAW 230 (2018).
113. Id. at 229–82.
114. Id. at 230.
115. Id. at 270.
116. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400 (Eng.).
117. Id. at 643.
118. Id. at 406.

2020] Directors' Duty of Care During a Global Pandemic

121

possible at that time, one of “gross neglect” or “crassa negligentia.”119
The modern leading case on the duty of care under UK law is
the 1925 decision, In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.120
That case concerned the liability of directors and other company officers for losses sustained by the company.121 The liquidators relied upon the misfeasance provisions of the 1908 Companies (Consolidation) Act, which essentially required willful
neglect.122 In the decision, the judge accepted that “gross negligence” involved a different standard than mere negligence and
applied a 19th century subjective standard of negligence, under
which a director need not exhibit a higher degree of skill than
may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge
and experience.123 The Master of the Rolls said:
If directors act within their powers, if they act with such
care as is reasonably to be expected from them, having
regard to their knowledge and experience, and if they
act honestly for the benefit of the company they represent, they discharge both their equitable as well as their
legal duty to the company.124
The standard of gross neglect was regarded as undesirable
because it didn’t provide sufficient reason for deterring poor

119. See ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023, [420] (“Although the
Lord Chancellor recognised that liability existed for the honorary directors,
the imposition of a standard of “gross neglect” or crassa negligentia imposed
the lowest of the standards recognised by Holt CJ in Coggs. This became a
common approach to honorary positions in the 19th century.”).
120. See generally In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. [1925] Ch. 407.
121. Id. at 409–10.
122. See §215 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, 8 Edw. 7 c. 69
(U.K.). Today, the equivalent provisions are incorporated in §212–§213 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 (fraudulent trading).
123. In re City [1925] Ch. at 436.
124. Id. at 428–29. See also Lagunas Nitrate Co versus Lagunas Syndicate
[1899] 2 Ch. 392, 435 (“The inquiry, therefore, is reduced to want of care and
bona fides with a view to the interests of the nitrate company. The amount of
care to be taken is difficult to define; but it is plain that directors are not liable for all the mistakes they may make, although if they had taken more care
they might have avoided them: see Overend, Gurney & Co v Gibb. Their negligence must be not the omission to take all possible care; it must be much
more blameable than that: it must be in a business sense culpable or gross. I
do not know how better to describe it.”).

122

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 46:1

performance by failing directors.125 In contrast to Delaware, the
standard for breach of the duty of care under modern UK law
has risen considerably and is no longer one of “gross negligence.”126 Furthermore, while in Delaware the business judgment rule is a fundamental concept of corporate law, it is not
formally recognized in the UK’s company law.127 Despite this
discrepancy between those legal systems, it was argued that
UK courts traditionally refuse to impose liability on directors
for honest mistakes of judgment similarly to the position of
Delaware courts.128
A recent empirical study demonstrated that claimants have
had success challenging business judgments in England and
Wales dating from the mid-nineteenth century until the present, and that there has been a significant increase in personal
liability since 2007.129 Given there have been no pertinent
changes in statutory law, this is likely the consequence of a
greater willingness by claimants in insolvent companies to
challenge directors’ business judgment.130 Therefore, the researchers particularly emphasized that the proposition that
English courts will not review directors’ business decisions, as
is the norm in Delaware, is unfounded.131 The study showed
that challenges to business judgments were made and, following a court’s review of directors’ business judgment, liability
was imposed in all the eras surveyed.132 Moreover, it was found
that liability was frequently imposed on the basis of flawed
business judgment or the existence of conflicts of interest.133
Lastly, while the study’s observations mainly relate to litiga125. KERSHAW, supra note 112, at 264 (“[A] strong consensus view was
formed in commentary that the standard was weak and inappropriate for
modern corporate conditions and, therefore, in need of reform to ensure that
failing directors could be held to account and to deter poor performance.”).
126. ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023, [428] (“By the 1990s at the
latest, the common law and equity had moved to a position where a director’s
duty to take care was one which was concerned with negligence, not gross
negligence.”).
127. Hill & Conaglen, supra note 110, at 325.
128. Id. at 324.
129. Andrew Keay, Joan Loughrey, Terry McNulty, Francris Okanigbuan,
& Abigail Stewart, Business Judgment and Director Accountability: A Study
of Case-Law Over Time, 20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 359, 359 (2020).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 386.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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tion carried on directors of private and insolvent companies,
directors of large public companies remain insulated from being held accountable by the English courts.134
B. The Civil Law
This section considers the civil law approach on directors’
standard of care by discussing its versatility across different
industries and how it takes a flexible approach according to the
special features of the companies involved.
1. Germany
Under German law, the duty of care imposed on the directors
obliges them to collect comprehensive information and to assess the risks and benefits for the company from a proposed
transaction.135 The company’s interests are not limited to those
of shareholders, and as they encompass the interests of creditors, employees, consumers, and society.136 Engaging in risky
actions is generally permitted as long as the expected gains
balance such risks for the company.137 In order to fulfill the
standard of care, directors have to demonstrate that their
business decision were based on adequate information for the
best interest of the company.138 Under § 93(1) of the Stock
Company Act (AktG), the members of the management board
have to employ the care of a diligent and conscientious manag134. Id.
135. Gudula Deipenbrock, The ‘Business Judgment Rule’ and the Problem of
Hindsight Bias – Observations from a German Company Law Perspective,
27 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 197, 203–07 (2016).
136. Anja Tuschke & Marius Luber, Corporate Governance in Germany:
Converging Towards Shareholder Value-Orientation or Not So Much? in THE
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISE AND PROSPECTS 75, 77
(Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012). Recently, a major newspaper in Germany devoted an extensive article to discussing the history of
stakeholders’ approach in the country (including the period of 1933–1945) by
comparing it to the American shareholder primacy model. See Franz W.
Wagner, Warum Manager lügen müssen, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG (Oct.
3,
2020);
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/gastbeitrag-warummanager-luegen-muessen-16984171.html. I thank my colleague Mr. Roland
Kemper for bringing this article to my attention.
137. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Company Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGB. I at
1089, last amendment in BGB I at 2586, July 23, 2013, §§ 93(1)-(2) (Ger.).
138. Gerhard Wagner, Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German Law
— A Potemkin Village, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 69, 73–74 (2015).
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er in connection with the management of the company. Germany incorporated the business judgment rule as a codified rule
but has implemented it differently than Delaware law.139 In
Delaware law under the business judgment rule, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show that directors acted negligently,
while in Germany, the burden of proof is on the directors to
demonstrate their conduct was carried out with due care.140
German law provides that the duty of care is not uniform
across industries, but adjusts to the specific situation for which
the question of due care arises. Accordingly, the standard of
due care is at the same time objective and relative; i.e., a company comparable in size, business, and economic situation will
serve as a comparative model.141 Thus, board members’ duty of
care cannot be measured against a uniform standard, since liabilities that fall on these individuals depend on their positions
and knowledge base, as well as on the particularities of companies. Thus, rather than striving to articulate general key
standards for an informed decision-making process which are
applicable to all public companies across different industries,
German law is designed to provide firm-specific standards of
care following the special features of the corporations and markets. Consequently, it can be argued that what constitutes a
care violation may be different from one company to another.142
2. France
In France, L225–251 of The Code de Commerce provides that
a director or manager will be liable to the company “either for
139. AktG § 93(1) cl. 2.
140. April 1997, BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/Garmenbeck); see also Aurelio
Gurrea-Martínez, Re-examining the Law and Economics of the Business
Judgment Rule: Notes for its Implementation in Non-US Jurisdictions, 18 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 417, 420 (2018).
141. Deipenbrock, supra note 135, at 205; see also Robert J. Rhee, The Tort
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1139, 1143 (2013) (arguing that “Under the tort doctrine of industry customs,
the scope of a director’s duty of care reflects the implied standard of care that
would be adopted by market participants.”).
142. CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE & MICHAEL ANDERSON SCHILLIG,
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 508–509 (2019) (“On the other hand, what can be
expected of a diligent and conscientious manager depends on the individual
circumstances of the case, in particular the type of company and industry, the
financial situation of the company, general market conditions, and the director’s role within the company’s governance structure.”).
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infringements of the laws or regulations applicable to public
limited companies . . . or for breaches of the articles of association, or for management mistakes.”143 However, those provisions do not discuss the specific standard of care that directors
and managers’ conduct is subject to.144 Although France did not
adopt the business judgment rule explicitly, its courts are not
likely to second-guess business decisions so long as the company does not become insolvent.145 The law does not contain any
definition of mismanagement or lack of due care, and the concept of negligence is highly fact-specific.146 In addition, directors must exercise the care and diligence that can reasonably
be expected from them in light of the circumstances of the case,
including the director’s role in the company and the nature of
the company, i.e., whether it is a small family-owned business
or a significant stock exchange-listed corporation.147
Moreover, director liability is determined according to the
question of whether his conduct follows the interests of the
company.148 While the Anglo-American law adopts a narrow
interpretation of a company’s goal—focused exclusively on advancing the interests of shareholders—French law employs a
relatively comprehensive understanding of the corporate interest.149 Accordingly, companies are “considered as a separate
economic agent, pursuing its own objectives which are distinct
from those of shareholders, employees, creditors including the
internal revenue authorities, suppliers and customers.”150 The
interest of the company “represents the common interest of all
of these persons, which is for the company to remain in business and prosper.”151 Thus, the French pluralistic understanding of company’s goal provides directors with a substantially
more flexible and wider scope of action than the one provided
by the Anglo-American law. It enables directors to make deci143. Rolf Dotevall, Is a Common Structure of Company Directors’ Duties
Evolving in EU?, 27 EURO. BUS. L. REV. 285, 289–90 (2016).
144. GERNER-BEUERLE & SCHILLIG, supra note 142, at 519.
145. Id. at 521.
146. Id. at 522.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 521–22.
149. THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN FRANCE, CONSEIL
NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANÇAIS & ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE DES ENTERPRISES
PRIVÉES 7 (1995).
150. GERNER-BEUERLE & SCHILLIG, supra note 142, at 52.
151. Id.
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sions that may not necessarily align with the interests of
shareholders but, nevertheless, are required to ensure the continuing existence of company, especially during difficult economic times.
3. Italy
Directors are subject to a duty of care when performing their
responsibilities. They are required to satisfy the obligations
provided by the law and by the articles of association with the
diligence required by their office and their professional competence.152 Similarly to France, the company’s goal is perceived in
broader terms, and as a result, directors are required to advance the interests of all stakeholders. Thus, directors may
pursue objectives other than those of shareholders when it is in
the best interest of the company as a separate business entity.153 Italian law employs an objective standard of care alongside subjective elements.154 Hence, Italian courts are required
to consider directors’ education and professional experience, as
well as the company’s dimension, type of business, and its complexity.155 Italian law does not include any specific provision
preventing judges from examining decisions made by directors
retrospectively. However, the conventional understanding in
Italy is that courts will not engage in a direct and substantive
review of the business decision making process.156 Thus, several Italian scholars argue that the national courts employ a robust version of the business judgment rule, which provides directors and managers with broad discretion when making
business decisions.157
4. The Netherlands
Directors are required to meet the standard of care that can
be expected of a director who is competent for his task and per-

152. Art. 2392 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.).
153. Carlo Amatucci, Directors’ Duties in Italy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 141, 143 (Adolfo Paolini ed., 2014).
154. Id. at 145–46.
155. Id. at 145.
156. Guido Ferrarini, Gian Giacomo Peruzzo & Marta Roberti, Corporate
Boards in Italy, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 369, 397–99 (Paul Davies, et al. eds., 2013).
157. Id. at 397; Amatucci, supra note 153, at 144–45.
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forms his duties with diligence.158 The statutory requirement to
“properly perform” includes properly implementing the provisions of the law and the articles of association, as well as actions initiated by the shareholders.159 There is no general
standard similar to the business judgment rule. Courts generally do not second-guess actions that, under similar circumstances, could reasonably have been exercised by other, wellinformed, and diligent executives in similar positions and types
of industries or trades.160 Therefore, courts consider all the circumstances of the case, including: the nature of the activities of
the company; the risks which generally result from this type of
activity; the division of tasks within the board of directors; and
the knowledge that the director had or should have had at the
time of the disputed action.161 Moreover, the Netherlands applies the so-called “stakeholder model” as the leading concept
underlying directors’ duties.162 As a consequence, a company
director should at all times take due care of the company’s interest in a rather broad sense, including shareholders’, workers’, creditors’ interests, and even interests such as the environment and human rights.163 This comprehensive understand158. Arts. 2:9, 2:138, 2:149, 2:248, 2:259 BW (Neth.).
159. See STEVEN R. SCHUIT, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
NETHERLANDS: LEGAL, WORKS COUNCILS AND TAXATION 176 (2002).
160. Id.
161. Iris S. Wuisman & Rogier A. Wolf, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in
the Netherlands, in DIRECTORS & OFFICERS LIABILITY, TORT AND INSURANCE
LAW SERIES 295, 318 (Simon F. Deakin, Helmut Koziol & Olaf Riss, eds.,
2018).
162. See, e.g., Christiaan de Brauw, The Dutch Stakeholder Experience,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
CORP.
GOV.
(Aug.
2,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/02/the-dutch-stakeholderexperience/.
163. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code states that the “management
board should develop a view on long-term value creation” and “attention
should [also] be paid to ‘any other aspects relevant to the company and its
affiliated enterprise, such as the environment, social and employee-related
matters, the chain within which the enterprise operates, respect for human
rights, and fighting corruption and bribery.’” The Dutch Corporate Governance Code, MONITORING COMMITTEE: CORP. GOV. CODE (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/thenetherlands_cgcode_
2016.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). See also Anne Lafarre & Christoph van
der Elst, Corporate Sustainability and Shareholder Activism in the Netherlands, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 260, 263 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher
Bruner eds., 2019).
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ing of the company’s goal enables directors to employ flexible
discretion concerning the entity’s strategy and policies, especially in challenging times during which the best interests of
the company are more complicated than usual.
C. Further Thoughts
While Anglo-American law provides a unified standard of
care that is insensitive to the unique features across various
industries, the civil law systems employ a flexible standard of
care that is tailored to the company’s functions and relevant
characters of the markets. Since the civil law systems conceive
of the best interests of the company in broader terms than the
Anglo-American system, it provides directors with a larger expanse of discretion to handle the financial challenges associated with the global pandemic crisis. This observation is especially significant in times of financial distress when the conflict
between shareholders and creditors is heightened. In particular, firms whose values barely exceed their debt increase the
value of their shareholders’ wealth if they take increased risks
(including risks with negative expected returns), because if
things go well, the profit goes to the shareholders, whereas if
things go poorly, they lose no more than what they had already
invested.164 Creditors, however, can often be harmed by such
conduct because it increases the likelihood that the firm will
not be able to repay their debt, with no countervailing benefit if
the risky action pays off since creditors’ claims against the firm
are fixed.165 Therefore, providing directors with the ability to
consider the best interests of the company as an independent
legal entity, as in some of the civil law regimes noted above,
that is distinct from shareholders’ welfares enables companies
to employ a wider range of measures to ensure their survival
and future growth in this challenging financial period.
This broader range of available responses is particularly essential for SMEs that represent the core majority of businesses
worldwide. According to the International Council for Small
164. John Armour, Gerard Hertig, & Hideki Kanda, Transactions with
Creditors, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 111 (Reinier Kraakman ed., 2017).
165. For an illustration of this argument in economic modeling terms, see
Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, Governance and Stakeholders, in THE
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 642 (Benjamin
E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017).
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Business, micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises represent over 90% of all firms around the globe. Those firms provide almost 70% of the entire rate of global employment and
more than 50% of the world GDP.166 Also, SMEs are the backbone of Europe’s economy as they represent 99% of all businesses in the EU.167 In the past five years, they have created
around 85% of new jobs and provided two-thirds of the total
private sector employment in the EU.168 Therefore, the rest of
this piece is devoted to exploring the directors’ duties of care in
SMEs that are facing severe financial distress following the
current catastrophic pandemic.

166. Annual Global Micro-, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Report,
INT’L
COUNCIL
SMALL
BUS.
(2019),
https://icsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/REPORT-2019.pdf.
167. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD, SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
OUTLOOK 2019 36–38 (2019).
168. The Commission Recommendations of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises define SMEs according
to staff headcount and either turnover or balance sheet total, as demonstrated in the following chart:
Company cate- Staff headcount
Turnover
or
Balance sheet
gory
total
Medium-sized
< 250
≤ € 50 m
≤ € 43 m
Small
< 50
≤ € 10 m
≤ € 10 m
Micro
< 10
≤€2m
≤€2m
Source: The Commission of the European Union; https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:124:0036:0041:en:P
DF.
In the USA, the definition of SMEs is based on the position of the entity in
the overall marketplace. Section § 203 to the Small Business Act 1953 (15
U.S.C. chapter 14A.) (SBA) states: “[F]or the purposes of this Act, a smallbusiness concern, including but not limited to enterprises that are engaged in
the business of production of food and fiber, ranching and raising of livestock,
aquaculture, and all other farming and agricultural related industries, shall
be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated and which is
not dominant in its field of operation.” Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 83163, § 203, 67 Stat. 230 (1953). The SBA employs different economic factors,
such as each industry’s overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of
firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. See also Size
Standards Methodology White Paper, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.sba.gov/document/support—size-standards-methodology-whitepaper. See generally, ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40860, SMALL
BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
(2020).
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III. UNDERSTANDING DIRECTORS’ ROLE AND DUTIES IN SMES IN
TIMES OF BUSINESS DISTRESS
This Part is devoted to exploring directors’ roles in different
types of SMEs and explaining why the civil law provides boards
with a broader scope of discretion required to confront companies’ financial distress in the era of a global pandemic.
A. The Core Argument
Although SMEs play a significant role in the global business
sector, comparative corporate law is mostly concerned with
regulating the relationship between insiders and outsiders in
the context of large public companies. Thus, jurists and policymakers have given much less attention to constructing appropriate arrangements for governing the conduct of SMEs’ organs.169 Since a significant volume of companies around the
world are small firms involved in small-scale manufacturing
and provision of services, concentrating only on boards in large
publicly held companies, narrows the understanding of the role
and contribution of boards in other contexts—such as start-ups,
family businesses, or fast-growing entrepreneurial ventures
and partnerships.170 Arguably, SMEs need their boards of directors to play differing roles than those of large public corporations. For example, empirical studies show that SMEs typically have few owners and often feature an overlap between
ownership and management.171 Shareholders are often employed in the company, and they have long-term and close connections with each other through family connections.172 It can
be argued that to some extent in SMEs, the advisory function
169. Carlos Gorriz, EU Company Law: Past, Present and…Future?, GLOBAL
JURIST 1, 14 (2018) (“[T]he focus must continue on the needs of the enterprises; of all types of enterprises. It is important to pay attention to SMEs, because their necessities have been neglected.”).
170. Jonas Gabrielsson & Morten Huse, “Outside” Directors in SME Boards:
A Call for Theoretical Reflections, 1 CORP. BOARD: ROLE, DUTIES AND
COMPOSITION 28, 30 (2005).
171. Mette Neville, The Many Roles of Boards of SMEs, in BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND HARMONISING THEIR
ORGANISATION AND DUTIES 179 (Hanne S. Birkmose et al., 2013).
172. Qiang Cheng, Family Firm Research – A Review, 7 CHINA J. ACCT. RES.
149, 150 (2014) (“family owners have longer investment horizons than other
shareholders. They generally regard their ownership as an asset to pass on to
future generations . . . family members are actively involved in the management of their firms, either as top executives or as directors”).
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of the board is substantially more important than its monitoring function.173 The nexus between shareholders and managers
observed in such firms is a natural hindrance to emergence of
opportunistic behavior manifested in publicly held companies,
and consequently reduces monitoring costs.174 These agency
costs are not unheard of, however, and they often arise in the
context of venture capital investors that obtain funds from individual investors in exchange of various controlling and equity
rights.175
Nevertheless, given the emphasis on the advisory role of
SMEs’ directors, it is disputable whether the current law on
directors’ duty of care in different countries allows them sufficient breadth of conduct in times of financial distress. Civil law
rather than Anglo-American law provides directors with better
means to preserve companies’ solvency in periods of financial
crisis. Under civil law, the directors’ general duty of care towards the corporation can be construed so as to encompass the
stakeholders’ interests in preserving the assets and solvency of
the corporation.176 For instance, in the Netherlands, directors
are required to act in the best interest of the company and its
enterprise, and it is perceived to include all relevant stakeholders.177 The Dutch Supreme Court also confirmed that shareholder interests “do not take priority over the interests of other
173. Neville, supra note 171, at 185.
174. Eli Bukspan & Eylon Yadin, Marrying Corporate Law and Family
Businesses, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 550, 558 (2018) (“The controlling family often
places family members and close associates in senior managerial positions or
ensures family members are significantly represented on the board of directors and various supervisory committees. Consequently, family and senior
officers acting on behalf of the shareholders share the same interests; hence,
there are little to no conflicts of interest between owners and management”).
See generally Marcelo Godke Veiga & Joseph A. McCahery, A Theory of SME
Governance Regulation, 78 REVISTA DE DIREITO BANCARIO E DO MERCADO DE
CAPITAIS 1 (2017) who propose to create an analytical framework of the
promulgation of rules regulating SMEs that will be used based on technical
rationals.
175. Veiga & McCahery, supra note 174, at 24.
176. GREGOR BACHMANN, HORST EIDENMLLER, ANDREAS ENGERT, HOLGER
FLEISCHER, WOLFGANG SCHN., REGULATING THE CLOSED CORPORATION 101–04
(2014).
177. See generally Beate Sjafjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen,
& David Millon., Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable
Companies, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjafjell et al. eds.,
2015).
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stakeholders.”178 In a similar vein, France’s new PACTE Law
enshrines a principle that was previously developed in French
case law by adding the following provision to Article 1833 of
the Civil Code: “[t]he company is managed in its corporate interest . . .” and it must take into consideration “the social and
environmental issues related to its activity.”179 Accordingly, the
new PACTE Law encourages socially responsible business by
creating “mission businesses” (entreprises à mission): commercial companies that have, as their purpose, the pursuit of social
and environmental objectives.180
In contrast, the jurisprudence of the Delaware courts opposes
such concepts and insists that a board member’s duties are directed exclusively to protect shareholders’ interests.181 Broader
interests can be considered only when the corporation is insolvent.182 Similarly, UK law provides that only in the vicinity of
insolvency are directors required to act in the interest of the

178. See generally id.
179. Blanche Segrestin, Armand Hatchuel, & Kevin Levillain, When
the Law Distinguishes Between the Enterprise and the Corporation: The Case
of the New French Law on Corporate Purpose, (unpublished article) (on file
with J. BUS. ETHICS).
This notion is similar to the Benefit Corporations model which has now been
written into the laws of thirty three American states. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. Cin. L. Rev. 381, 383 (2017).
181. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (arguing that
stakeholderism could impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders,
and society at large and reduce corporate leaders’ accountability).
182. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 101 (Del. 2007) (“When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of
insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”); Prod. Res. Group v. NCT
Group, 863 A.2d 772, 787–89 (Del. Ch. 2004). For a similar position in the
UK, see BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana S.A. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 112 [198] (“[T]he
interests of creditors are identified as interests different from, and potentially
in conflict with, the promotion of the success of the company for the benefit of
its members as a whole.”). See also Brad Eric Scheler, Gary L. Kaplan, Jennifer L. Rodburg, & Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Director
Fiduciary Duty in Insolvency, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 15,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/15/director-fiduciary-duty-ininsolvency/.
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creditors “as a whole” rather than those of shareholders.183
Creditor-oriented duties in this stage of the firm lifecycle may
deter directors from placing assets in “high-risk, high-reward”
projects even though shareholders may support these strategies since their risk preferences have changed.184 The same explanation has been proposed to justify the wrongful trading
rule, which exposes directors of companies in liquidation or
administration to personal liability when they should have
known that there was no reasonable prospect of the company
avoiding insolvent liquidation and failed to employ “every step
with a view to minimizing the potential loss to the company’s
creditors.”185
The sharp distinction between the preference given to shareholders’ interests when the company is solvent and the preference given to creditors’ interests when the company is insolvent
does not provide directors with the necessary scope of discretion needed to stave off insolvency when adopting policies that
183. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(3) (UK); Colin Gwyer v. London
Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2748 [906] (Eng.).
184. Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability in Insolvency and Its Vicinity,
38(2) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 382, 388 (2018).
185. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45 §§ 214 (liquidation), 246ZB (administration)
(UK). It should be noted that similar care duties also exist in EU countries.
See Directive 2019/1023, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
June 2019 on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, on Discharge of Debt
and Disqualifications, and on Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Procedures Concerning Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge of Debt, and
Amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency), 2019 O.J. (L 172) 18, 19. See also Directive 2017/1132, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects
of company law (codification), 2017 O.J. (L 169) 46. Following the COVID-19
outbreak, the Executive of the Conference on European Restructuring and
Insolvency Law suggested that such duties should be suspended because the
current economic uncertainty hampers the effectiveness of this duty which is
aimed at selecting non-viable businesses. See generally STEPHAN MADAUS &
BOB WESSELS, CERIL EXECUTIVE STATEMENT 2020-1 ON COVID-19 AND
INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION (2020). Several countries, such as Germany, Spain
and Italy followed that recommendation. See Gert-Jan Boon, COVID-19 Crisis Requires Legislators to Adapt Insolvency Legislation, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-lawblog/blog/2020/03/covid-19-crisis-requires-legislators-adapt-insolvencylegislation; Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, Directors’ Duties of Financially Distressed Companies in the Time of COVID-19, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Mar. 24,
2020),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/03/directorsduties-financially-distressed-companies-time-covid-19.
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pursue objectives other than the shareholders’ interests. The
reticence to impose liability found in the Anglo-American regimes may, in some circumstances, incentivize directors to initiate insolvency proceedings even when an out-of-court restructuring attempt would be preferable and increase overall welfare. Moreover, those regimes raise special difficulties, such as
identifying when exactly the shift in the objective of duty of
care occurred.186 These difficulties are relevant to a much lesser
extent in civil law systems because those legal regimes provide
more nuanced arrangements to directors’ duty of care. Such
arrangements enable directors to implement a custodial approach, which focuses on protecting the company’s assets by
readopting an entrepreneurial strategy when possible, without
worrying that wrongful trading liability will be imposed on
them.187
Furthermore, since directors’ duty of care in civil law systems
follow firm-specific standards and the distinctive features of
industries and markets, it provides a more flexible framework
for promoting risk-taking, incentivizing business investment,
and reducing information gaps in times of financial distress.
For instance, a recent decision by the Dutch Supreme Court in
2014—A v. Cancun Holding I—indicates that the legal duties
of directors should be interpreted as following the organizational characteristics of an individual company.188 The facts of
this case are as follows: Cancun Holding II had been established in August 2005 by Cancun Holding I to develop a hotel
complex in the Mexican city of Cancun through its subsidiary
186. Andrew R. Keay, The Shifting of Directors’ Duties in the Vicinity of
Insolvency, 24(2) INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 140, 151 (2015).
187. Id. at 150–51; ANDREW R. KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE 306 (2011)
(“The directors can be seen as the ‘custodians of the enterprise objectives of
survival and growth.’”). See also Amir Licht, What’s so Wrong with Wrongful
Trading?—on Suspending Director Liability during the Coronavirus Crisis,
OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-lawblog/blog/2020/04/whats-so-wrong-wrongful-trading-suspending-directorliability-during.
188. HR 4 April 2014, NJ 2014, 286 m.nt. P. van Schilfgaarde (A/Cancun
Holding I) (Neth.) (translation by author) [hereinafter A/Cancun Holding I];
HR 4 April 2014, RvdW 2014, 557 m.nt. (TMF Netherlands BV/Cancun Holding I) (Neth.) (translation by author); HR 4 april 2014, RvdW 2014, 558 m.nt.
(Inversiones/Cancun Holding I) (Neth.) (translation by author); HR 4 April
2014, RvdW 2014, 556 m.nt. (Invernostra SL/Cancun Holding I) (Neth.)
(translation by author).
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entity, Efesyde SA de CV.189 In October 2006, Cancun Holding I
transferred 50% of its shares of Cancun Holding II to Inversiones Ma y Mo SL (Inversiones).190 On June 2009, Invernostra
SL (Invernostra) acquired 7% of the shares of Cancun Holding
II.191 During 2008, disputes arose between Cancun Holding I
and Inversiones about the costs associated with building and
operating the hotel complex.192 The shares that Cancun Holding I held in Cancun Holding II were “A-shares”; the stocks
that Inversiones held in Cancun Holding II were “B-shares”;
and the shares that Invernostra owned in Cancun Holding II
were “C-shares.”193 The articles of association posited that the
owners of A, B and C shares held the right to nominate managing directors of Cancun Holding II.194 During 2009, the board of
Cancun Holding II suggested that Cancun Holding II issues
shares to Inversiones and Invernostra—but not to Cancun
Holding I.195 The proposal would eventually dilute the holdings
of Cancun Holding I from 22% to 0.13%.196 Cancun Holding I
opposed the proposal and did not attend the general meeting
that would decide whether to issue the shares.197 As a result,
the shares could not be issued because, under the articles of
association, a resolution to issue shares required the participation of all shareholders and a unanimous vote.198 Nevertheless,
the articles allowed for a second general meeting to be convened where a resolution to issue shares could be executed
notwithstanding the number of participant shareholders and
by a simple majority.199 In accordance with the articles, the notice announcing this meeting was published in a local Mexican
189. A/Cancun Holding I para. 3.1(i) (translation by author).
190. Id. para. 3.1(ii) (translation by author).
191. Id. para. 3.1(iii) (translation by author).
192. Id. para. (xi) (taken from the appeals record included in this case)
(translation by author).
193. See id. para. 3.1(iii) (translation by author).
194. Id. para. (xvii) n.1 (taken from the appeals record included in this case)
(translation by author).
195. Id. para. (xxii) n. 1 (taken from the appeals record included in this
case) (translation by author).
196. Id. para. 3.1(xii) (translation by author).
197. Id. para. (xxiv) (taken from the appeals record included in this case)
(translation by author).
198. See id. para. (xxii) (taken from the appeals record included in this case)
(translation by author).
199. See id. para. (xxiv) (taken from the appeals record included in this
case) (translation by author).
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newspaper.200 Cancun Holding I was not represented in this
general meeting because it was not aware of it.201 In the proceedings initiated by Cancun Holding I against Cancun Holding II, the Enterprise Court approved the request of Cancun
Holding I that an independent investigation be conducted into
the course of affairs of Cancun Holding II.202 In April 2014, the
Dutch Supreme Court revoked these appeals and explained
that if the company carries on as an enterprise, the interests of
the company will be furthered by promoting the lasting success
of that enterprise and preserving the company’s other organizational characteristics.203 The Court ruled that in a joint venture, the type and content of the agreement between shareholders determines the corporate interests and will seek to create a balanced and stable relationship between shareholders.204
Accordingly, the duty of corporate directors is guided by the
best interests of the company and the undertaking the company pursues.205 Thus, directors should consider the project that
is connected with the company’s business as well as other organizational characteristics to understand the content of their
duties.206 In the Cancun case, the firm was a joint venture
company in which the shareholders were, and were intended to
remain, equal.207 In different cases, however, “other organizational characteristics may be relevant: e.g. that the company is
the parent company of a group, that the company is a subsidiary company in a group, that the company has only one shareholder or that the company is a family business.”208

200. Id. para. 3.1(xii) (translation by author).
201. Id. para. 3.4.5 (translation by author).
202. See id. para. 3.2 (translation by author).
203. Cornelis de Groot, Some Observations on the Nature of the Company,
Especially Against the Backdrop of the Duty of Directors to be Guided by its
best Interests, in CORE CONCEPTS IN THE DUTCH CIVIL CODE: CONTINUOUSLY IN
MOTION 187, 207–09 (C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd et al. eds., 2016).
204. See Martin Gelter, Nemika Jha & D. Gordon Smith, Duties of Nominee
Directors, in COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW A CASE-BASED APPROACH 73, 93–94
(Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds., 2018).
205. See id. at 93.
206. Id. at 94.
207. Id. (“In the Cancun case there was, in short, a shareholder agreement
on the basis of which shareholders had agreed to collaborate in the joint venture on the basis of equality.”).
208. Groot, supra note 203, at 209.
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Another instructive example is the Swedish Supreme Court’s
ruling concerning the limits of board responsibility for not
submitting the necessary financial reports to the general meeting of shareholders in times of financial distress.209 In this case,
the Court considered whether individuals who joined the board
of directors in the period of the company’s statutory duty
should incur the same liability as other members who have
served on the board for a long period.210 The Court ruled that
the liability assessment should focus on whether the director
acts in a way that is in accordance with the company’s current
situation and “a newly appointed board member cannot be assessed according to the same standard as the one who has a
long time behind him on the board.”211 Therefore, the Court
posits that the law should not require newly appointed board
member be fully acquainted with the company’s conditions
from day one, and “a time limit for the member to familiarize
himself with these must be accepted.”212 Moreover, the Court
expressed the view that the liability assessment should focus
on whether the director acts in a way that is in accordance with
the company’s current situation,213 and director business judgment should be reviewed more freely if a company is struggling
with severe economic difficulties.214 As was clarified by the
Court:
The negligence test should not focus on questions of
admissibility but on whether the board member concerned has acted responsibly in the specific situation in
which the company was. In the frame of court’s ex postassessments, a relatively generous and understanding
view of what should have been done and not done will
be carried out. As long as the board member has met
reasonable requirements when it comes to staying informed and making a serious evaluation of the situation, there is rarely a reason to question the conclusions
the board member has reached.215
209. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA][Supreme Court Reports] 2012 p. 858 T
5779-10 (Swed.) (translation by author).
210. See id. para. 11 (translation by author).
211. Id. para. 21 (translation by author).
212. Id. para. 23 (translation by author).
213. See id. paras. 21–22 (translation by author).
214. Id. para. 22 (translation by author).
215. Id. (translation by author).
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B. Directors’ Roles in Family Business in Period of Financial
Crisis
This section draws distinctions between two types of SMEs,
family businesses and venture capital-backed firms, and discusses boards’ roles in confronting the consequences of the
global epidemic situation.216 Family companies have several
unique features that provide them with an advantage over nonfamily companies: long-term vision; matching interests between owners, management, employees, and the company; and
a correlation between the reputation and public image of the
family and the company.217 Generally, these firms adopt a
business approach that encourages long-term perspectives over
short-term profits.218 Studies have shown that family firms are
more risk averse than non-family firms, invest in safer research and development projects, and carry lower levels of debt
in an effort to prepare for potential future periods of financial
distress.219 This long-term business vision causes family firms
to reinforce relations with various financial providers, such as
creditors, suppliers, banks, and other claimants.220 Although
the literature on boards’ roles has focused on family-firm directors’ monitoring role, it must be noted that the board also
makes significant contributions as an adviser and provider of
valuable resources, especially in times of crisis.221
The director’s advisory role is reflected in two main board
tasks. First, the resource-based approach posits that directors
provide professional competencies, skills and experiences to
family businesses.222 They complement the management team’s
knowledge base, especially when there is a “lack [in] internal

216. Gabrielsson & Huse, supra note 170, at 31–34.
217. Bukspan & Yadin, supra note 174, at 563–65.
218. Id.
219. Martin R. W. Hiebl, Risk Aversion in Family Firms: What do we really
know?, 14(1) JOURNAL OF RISK FINANCE 49, 56–57 (2013).
220. Bukspan & Yadin, supra note 174, at 558–59.
221. Julio Pindado & Ignacio Requejo, Family Business Performance from a
Governance Perspective: A Review of Empirical Research, 17 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 279, 292 (2015).
222. See Jefferey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and its Environment, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 218, 219
(1972) (considering the “use of the board of directors as a vehicle for dealing
with problems of external interdependence and uncertainty, resulting from
its exchange of resources with important external organization.”).
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resources and expertise to pursue growth.”223 Second, the resource-dependent approach posits that directors provide access
to critical external stakeholders by linking the firm to its external environment.224 Formation of alliances by securing good
relationships with other stakeholders is especially necessary to
overcome family firms’ general resource-scarcity.225 When faced
with cash-flow problems and loss of reputation in times of crisis, directors can activate their external networks in search of
relief. In such cases, directors can attract additional equity
providers who can improve the financial condition of the
firm.226 Moreover, in the period of financial distress, directors
can communicate the company’s unique family values to various stakeholders and recruit them to contribute essential resources required to the firm’s survival.
Another study examined the main factors that contribute to
the survival of family firms in periods of financial crisis.227 Several attributes of board of directors are significant in determining whether the company will survive in financially difficult
times. Attributes like size, age and experience of directors,
gender diversity, director location, and directors’ personal networks have been shown to relate to lower bankruptcy risk.228
Also, board members who already have experience with crises
management better understand the challenges the family firm
is facing and can employ that experience to mitigate the bankruptcy risk.229 In contrast, board instability as reflected in resignations from the board in a given year and previous failure

223. Yannick Bammens, Wim Voordeckers & Anita Van Gils, Boards of Directors in Family Businesses: A Literature Review and Research Agenda, 13
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 134, 141 (2011).
224. Fynn-Willem Lohe & Andrea Calabrò, Please Do Not Disturb! Differentiating Board Tasks in Family and Non-Family Firms During Financial Distress, 33 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 36, 38–39 (2017).
225. Sabine B. Rau, Resource-Based View of Family Firms, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF FAMILY BUSINESS 321, 331 (Leif Melin, Mattias Nordqvist &
Pramodita Sharma eds., 2014).
226. Lohe & Calabrò, supra note 224, at 40.
227. Nick Wilson, Mike Wright & Louise Scholes, Family Business Survival
and the Role of Boards, 37(6) ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 1369
(2013).
228. Id. at 1369–70.
229. Id. at 1383.
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experiences of board members are associated with higher bankruptcy risk.230
When assessing the conduct of a family firms’ directors, particular attention should be paid to certain features of the firm,
namely, the socio-emotional wealth associated with controlling
the family business.231 First, while most studies find that family firms are more risk-averse than non-family firms, this attitude may change for larger, financially distressed family companies that compare in size to large public corporations.232 In
such cases, there is a higher tendency for the controlling family
to take risks at the expense of other stakeholders, such as creditors and employees.233 Second, the amount of risk a family firm
takes on “strongly depends on the situation of the family firm .
. . .”234 When the family owners fear losing control of the firm,
they may choose to engage in riskier ventures than non-family
firms.235 In that case, there is a concern that the family will
employ every means available to save the socio-emotional
wealth associated with controlling a firm, even if such actions
include inflicting substantial risks on stakeholders.236
In these circumstances, civil law, rather than AngloAmerican law, provides a better systematic framework for directors to promote the best interests of the company rather
than those of the controlling shareholders. This also applies to
230. Id.
231. See L.R. Gómez-Mejía, Katalin Takács, Manuel Núñez-Nickel, Kathyrn
J. L. Jacobson, & José Moyano-Fuentes, Socioemotional Wealth and Business
Risks in Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mill,
52(1) ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 106, 106 (2007) (According to the
socio-emotional wealth, the owner of a family firm derives a nonfinancial/non-economical value from its owning and controlling position in the
firm, such as “identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty.”).
232. Hiebl, supra note 219, at 62.
233. Id. at 62–63.
234. Id. at 49.
235. See id.
236. Gómez-Mejía, Takács, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes,
supra note 231, at 129 (“We have shown that when family firms are faced
with a strategic choice dilemma that involves (1) a high degree of certainty of
improved financial gains and a better probability of survival, but loss of family control (i.e., joining the coop), and (2) a greater risk of declining performance and catastrophic business failure, but retention of family control (i.e.,
choosing to remain independent and not join the coop), the clear winner is the
“risk willing” decision.”).
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board members who were appointed by a significant individual
shareholder, since a close connection between a director and a
major shareholder may undermine the traditional principle of
equality between shareholders in civil company law.237 This civil law determination conflicts with the position of UK law,
which generally provides that directors owe fiduciary duties to
the company as a whole, but also allows for certain circumstances in which directors will owe specific responsibilities to
individual shareholders.238 In such cases, individual shareholders may bring a direct action, as distinct from a derivative action, against the directors for breach of fiduciary duty.239
A recent English case, Vald Nielsen Holding A/S v Baldorino
considered the following facts: The management team of a
company called Updata Infrastructure (UK) Ltd (the Target)
launched a management buy-out with the support of a private
equity house.240 Following a bidding process, the entire issued
share capital of the Target was bought by a new company
(Newco), in which the management team had significant
stakes.241 In the stage of the bidding process, the controlling
shareholders in the Target had concluded that the offer presented by the management teams was more attractive than the
offer made by a rival bid.242 Nevertheless, several shareholders
believed that they were misled by false representations by the
management team about the Target’s financial condition and
the proceedings received were significantly less than the true
value of the shares.243 Thus, shareholders argued that they are
entitled to recover an account of profits as a result of the management team’s breach of fiduciary duties directed to protect
their special interests.244 The court examined English, Australian, and New Zealand case law and decided that, while as general rule directors do not owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders, the rule is subject to a caveat which revolves around
237. Gudmund Knudsen & Harald Norvik, Corporate Governance in Norway, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 201, 228 (Per Lekvall
ed., 2014).
238. Peskin v. Anderson [2001] BCC 87, para. 31.
239. Id. para. 31–34.
240. Vald Nielsen Holding A/S v Baldorino [2019] EWHC 1926 (Comm) [para 1–3].
241. Id. para. 3.
242. Id.
243. Id. para. 1–15.
244. Id. para. 14.
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the nature of the relationship between directors and shareholders.245 The judge accepted that a director acquiring shares
from a shareholder does not of and in itself create a fiduciary
duty.246 The existence of such duty depends upon the relationship between the directors and the affected shareholders and
the mere fact that a director had knowledge of the company’s
affairs does not itself give rise to exceptional circumstances.247
The court further stated these special circumstances are more
likely to arise when the shareholder is an owner of a family
firm, indicating a special relationship between this shareholder
and directors.248 This last observation is misplaced because
such a unique connection between shareholder and director can
be used, in certain circumstances, against the best independent
interests of the company. This is especially prevalent in situations where the family firm is in a severe economic crisis, and
there is a particular concern from losing the socio-emotional
wealth associated with control.249 The significant hazard from
externalizing risks on creditors to ensure continued control
may justify the adoption of the civil law approach rather than
the UK approach for adequately ensuring the continuing survival of the company.
C. Directors’ Roles in Venture Capital-Backed Firms in Period
of Financial Crisis
Typical descriptions of corporate governance focus on shareholder-manager conflicts or potential controlling shareholder
opportunism towards minority shareholders. These descriptions do not adequately describe the operations of startups that
involve participants who often hold overlapping and shifting
roles.250 As an example, consider a venture capitalist (VC) in245. Id. para. 722–23.
246. Id. para. 745.
247. Id. para. 744.
248. Id. para. 725.
249. Gómez-Mejía, Takács, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes,
supra note 231, at 107 (“Family firms may be willing to incur a greater performance hazard, as evidenced by a greater probability of failure and belowtarget performance, if this is what it takes to protect their socioemotional
wealth. Hence, they are loss averse when it comes to threats to their socioemotional wealth (relinquishing family control) even if this means accepting
a greater performance hazard.”).
250. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 159–61
(2019).
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vestor with a seat on the board of a startup. The investor holds
dual status as principal in one context and agent in another.
The resource-dependent view posits that VC investors and
founders collaborate to seek mutual gain while being dependent on each other’s contribution.251 Entrepreneurs require capital injection for growth, and typically have limited sources to
raise that capital because they are private firms with a high
risk of failure252 Although VC investors are generally less dependent on the entrepreneur because they manage a portfolio
of entrepreneurial firms,253 they generally inject capital only
when they identify outstanding managerial capabilities that
can increase firm performance.254 Typically, startups have multiple classes of stock consisting of preferred stock held by VC
investors and common stock held by founders and company
employees.255 These classes create a capital structure that gives
rise to a significant and complicated conflict of interests between different groups of shareholders concerning the control
of the firm.256 As a startup matures, participants’ roles expand
in managing the firm’s operation and they may hold varied interests and claims affecting firm’s governance.257
The conflict between VC investors and entrepreneurs in a period of financial distress was recently illustrated in the Delaware case, In re Trado.258 Trados faced financial difficulties
when a potential purchaser emerged, and the board decided to
sell the corporation at a deal price almost equal to the preferred liquidation preference.259 The merger consideration satis251. Andrew Zacharakis, Truls Erikson & Bradley George, Conflict Between
the VC and Entrepreneur: The Entrepreneur’s Perspective, 12(2) VENTURE
CAP. 109, 111–12 (2010).
252. Id. at 111.
253. Id. at 111–12.
254. See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV.
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works (“During this adolescent
period of high and accelerating growth, it can be extremely hard to distinguish the eventual winners from the losers because their financial performance and growth rates look strikingly similar . . . At this stage, all companies are struggling to deliver products to a product-starved market. Thus the
critical challenge for the venture capitalist is to identify competent management that can execute – that is, supply the growing demand.”).
255. Pollman, supra note 250, at 170–76.
256. Id. at 176–96.
257. Id. at 196–200.
258. See generally In re Trados S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
259. Id. at 33.
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fied nearly all the preferred liquidation preference and left no
yields for the common stock.260 The board of directors’ decision
to sell the corporation was challenged by a stockholder who
owned 5% of the corporation’s common stock.261 Although the
Delaware Court of Chancery found that common stockholders
in Trados as a going concern were unharmed,262 it emphasized
that the board does not owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders and should consider the interests of common stockholders solely as “residual claimants.”263 The interests of preferred
stockholders should be taken into consideration only to the extent that they do not invoke their exclusive contractual
rights.264 The Chancery Court acknowledged the heterogeneity
on the board, which is reflected in directors acting as “dual fiduciaries”—i.e., they have fiduciary duties to the venture fund
itself, as well as to the stockholders of the company on whose
board they serve.265 Importantly, the court applied the same set
of fiduciary duties to all directors across the board—including
those from the VC firm that held preferred stock.266 Accordingly, directors are obligated to identify and advance the shared
interest of preferred and common stockholders. This guideline
proves problematic when preferred and common stockholders
firmly disagree over which course of action promotes the position of “stockholders in the aggregate.”267 In addition, since the
court identified the overall benefit of the company with advancing the interests of the common stockholders solely, it did not
260. Id.
261. Id. at 34–35.
262. Id. at 76.
263. Id. at 41–42.
264. Id. at 39–40.
265. Steven E. Boschner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board
Member’s Survival Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two
Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4–10 (2016); Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2015) (arguing that under conditions of
boards’ heterogeneity “[t]he content of the corporate objective and of the fiduciary duties is indirectly determined (1) by the factors that influence the appointment of directors and the pressure on information sharing that derives
thereof, which is how constituency directors deal with their sponsors with
respect to information; and (2) social, cultural, and economic factors that determine how directors come to their decisions.”).
266. In re Trados S’holder Litig., at 40–42.
267. See, e.g., Fredrick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp et al. 2017
WL 1437308, at 17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017).
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consider any other stakeholders interests that surely would
have been affected by such determination.
Moreover, in times of financial distress, the conflict between
VC investors and entrepreneurs may manifest in other aspects
of strategic decision-making, such as research and development
(R&D) activities and marketing schedules.268 Naturally, any
strategy that will be chosen by the board of directors has significant implications on the welfare and attitude of other stakeholders involved in the company’s business, such as creditors,
suppliers, consumers, and employees. Therefore, several commentators argue that to mitigate the horizontal conflicts of interest, the board of directors should employ a duty of impartiality.269 This duty involves considering the different interests of
the beneficiaries honestly and balancing them in a manner in
accordance with the beneficial interests and the terms and
purposes of the company.270 Accordingly, in times of financial
distress, directors have to fairly, rather than equally, assess
the divergent demands of stakeholders and ensure that adopting individual strategy will not disproportionately externalize
risks on any specific constituency or involve opportunistic behavior by a particular stakeholder.
The civil law concerning a director’s fiduciary duties provides
a more fertile ground for adopting the fiduciary duty of impartiality than the Anglo-American law. As shown above, civil law
views the corporation’s benefits as comprised of all the stakeholders’ interests who are involved in the firm’s operations and
rejects the idea that corporation’s benefit should be solely identified with advancing the welfare of shareholders. For instance,
in the Cancun case, the Dutch Supreme Court held that every
director must be guided by the interests of the corporation itself even if that director was appointed to his role by shareholders.271 Moreover, civil law perceives the company as an in268. See Ronit Yitshaki, Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur Conflicts: An Exploratory Study of Determinants and Possible Resolutions, 19(3) INT’L. J. OF
CONFLICT MGMT. 262, 276–78 (2008), for an extensive discussion.
269. Shachar Nir, One Duty to All: The Fiduciary Duty of Impartiality and
Stockholders’ Conflict of Interest, 16(1) HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 35 (2020). See
generally, Amir N. Licht, Stakeholder Impartiality: A New Classic Approach
for the Objectives of the Corporation, in FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS
(Arthur Laby & Jacob Hale Russell eds., forthcoming 2020).
270. Nir, supra note 269, at 35–41.
271. A/Cancun Holding I para. 4.2.3 (“Each director is obliged to act in accordance with the interests of the company and its affiliated company and to
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dependent and distinct legal entity with its own interests and
not as a mere device for enhancing shareholders’ utility.272
Therefore, a comprehensive inquiry is focused on ensuring the
survival of the company as a going concern rather than securing the particular demands of any group of stakeholders. This
determination is additionally further reinforced by a recent
empirical study examining the role of independent directors in
mitigating conflict within startup firms’ decision-making. Michael Ewens and Nadya Malenko examined the dynamics of
boards of directors’ size and composition, as well as the evolution of control over the startup lifecycle.273 Generally, startup
lifecycle’s phases are characterized by equity and resource contributions of different stakeholders who receive equity and controlling rights in exchange. For instance, as the capital provided by VC investors increases, control over the board tends to
shift, evolving from the founders’ having ultimate authority to
shared control with the VC investors and eventually to the VC
investors having sole control after later rounds of financing.274
This evolution of control tends to track with increases in the
VCs’ bargaining power.275 Ewens and Malenko demonstrate
that after the first round of financing, the average board has
3.6 members and the founders most frequently maintain control.276 As firms go through successive rounds of financing, the
number of VC directors tend to increase, with the fourth financing round providing the tipping point where the average
firm has 53% of board seats held solely by VC investors.277 The
stage where control over the board is shared between VCs and
founders often leads to disagreements over a range of significant business issues, such as whether to seek additional rounds
of financing, exit decisions, or how to confront financial distress
exercise due care towards all those involved in the company and its business,
regardless of whether a director is appointed by or on the recommendation of
the company, meeting of shareholders of a particular type or designation.”).
272. See generally Andrew R. Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective:
An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model, 71 MOD. L. REV. 663
(2008), for a suggestion to adopt such an approach in the UK law.
273. See Michael Ewens & Nadya Malenko, Board Dynamics over the
Startup Lifecycle (European Corp. Gov’t Inst., Working Paper No. 87, 2020)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3640898.
274. Id. at 5–6.
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id. at 3.
277. Id. at 23–25.
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that may require reorganization.278 Ewens and Malenko
demonstrate that the presence of independent directors consistently increases with startup age and financing rounds, and
that they are added to the board of directors to mediate conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs.279 As a result, independent directors provide both mediating and advising services over the startup lifecycle, and those functions can increase firm value.280 As the authors conclude:
Our key hypothesis is that unlike in public firms, where
the main roles of independent directors are monitoring
and advising, an important role of independent directors
in VC-backed firms is mediation. Specifically, independent directors can help mediate conflicts between VC investors and entrepreneurs on the board, which can increase both the ex-post efficiency of decisions taken by
the firm and the ex-ante likelihood that the firm is financed. As the amount of financing contributed by VC
investors increases or as VC bargaining power relative
to the entrepreneur increases, the mediation role of independent directors becomes more important. As a result, the allocation of control over the board is likely to
change from entrepreneur control, to shared control
with independent directors serving as tie-breakers, and
then to VC control. We show that the patterns of board
composition and board control are broadly consistent
with the predictions of the mediation role. We also show
that over time, control over boards has shifted from VC
control to greater shared and entrepreneur control, consistent with the general trend towards lower VC bargaining power that has been documented in other studies.281
CONCLUSION
This article explored the regulatory arrangements of directors’ duty of care in SMEs from a comparative perspective and
argued that the civil law regime rather than the AngloAmerican one provides directors with a superior scope of discretion to handle the financial challenges of the global epidemic
because they follow a firm-specific perspective. This view con278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 32.
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siders the interests and demands of various stakeholders involved in the operations of the company and is independent
from advancing shareholders value. The current global pandemic will shine new light onto societal and economic systems
across the world that embrace stakeholders’ governance and
expose some of the flaws associated with Anglo-American law’s
strict focus shareholders’ benefit. As the economist Mariana
Mazzucato correctly observed:
On top of these self-inflicted wounds, an overly “financialized” business sector has been siphoning value out of
the economy by rewarding shareholders through stockbuyback schemes, rather than shoring up long-run
growth by investing in research and development, wages, and worker training. As a result, households have
been depleted of financial cushions, making it harder to
afford basic goods like housing and education. The bad
news is that the COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating all
these problems. The good news is that we can use the
current state of emergency to start building a more inclusive and sustainable economy. The point is not to delay or block government support, but to structure it
properly. We must avoid the mistakes of the post-2008
era, when bailouts allowed corporations to reap even
higher profits once the crisis was over, but failed to lay
the foundation for a robust and inclusive recovery.282
It can be expected that following the COVID-19 pandemic,
the deficiencies related to the rigorous shareholders’ capitalism
will yield further discussions on the merits of directors’ duty of
care. These discussions will likely cause legislators and courts
alike to reevaluate and redesign the duty of care that follows
a firm-specific view so that it considers the various demands of
stakeholders involved in the corporations’ businesses.

282. Mariana Mazzucato, Coronavirus and Capitalism: How Will the Virus
Change the Way the World Works?, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-covid19-businesseconomics-society-economics-change.

